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Abstract
We examine central bank intervention in foreign exchange markets using a dynamic censored regression
model. We allow the amount of purchase and sale interventions to depend nonlinearly upon lagged values
of intervention and on measures of disorderly foreign exchange markets. Using data for the CBRT, we
ﬁnd persistence in interventions, which may suggest the presence of political costs and/or a signal of
future monetary policy. We ﬁnd strong evidence of nonnormality and heteroskedasticity in the Tobit
model of the reaction function. Results using a robust estimator reveal the importance of considering
these speciﬁcation issues when modeling central bank intervention.
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A large body of empirical literature has found evidence that disorderly foreign exchange markets motivate
central bank intervention. Yet, because the costs of smoothing out these ﬂuctuations may exceed the
beneﬁts, the optimal level of intervention can take on zero values. Therefore, much of the recent literature
has focused on specifying and estimating a reaction function that allows for regions of zero intervention
in the presence of small variations in the measures of disorderly markets. For example Almekinders and
Eijﬃnger (1994) and Humpage (1999) use a Tobit model to study purchase and sale interventions separately;
Almekinders and Eijﬃnger (1996) and Kim and Sheen (2002) estimate a friction model to explain both
types of intervention simultaneously. Alternatively, Baillie and Osterberg (1997), Dominguez (1998), Kim
and Sheen (2002); McKenzie (2004), Frenkel and Stadtmann (2001), Frenkel, Pierdzioch and Stadtmann
(2003), and Ito and Yabu (2004) estimate discrete choice models for cases when the object of interest is the
probability of intervention.
Considerably less attention has been devoted to another aspect of the reaction function, this being the
substantial autocorrelation of interventions -purchase (sale) interventions on one day are usually followed
by purchase (sale) interventions on the following day. Accounting for this correlation seems to be key
to understanding the tactics used by the central bank when intervening in the foreign exchange market.
Until not long ago, the diﬃculty in estimating a dynamic reaction function resided in the lack of formal
econometric theory for a model allowing for zero responses of the dependent variable in the face of small
changes in the regressors, as well as the inclusion of lagged values of the dependent variable in the latter. Yet,
recent work by de Jong and Herrera (2004) establishes the asymptotic correctness of conditional maximum
likelihood estimation of the dynamic Tobit model, as well as that of Powell’s least absolute deviations (CLAD)
estimator for the dynamic censored regression model.
This paper analyzes and estimates the daily reaction function of the Central Bank of the Republic of
2Turkey -hereafter CBRT- in deciding the amount of purchases and sales to carry out in the foreign exchange
market during the managed ﬂoat and the free ﬂoat regimes. This paper is novel in at least three aspects.
First, we propose and estimate a reaction function that accounts for the dynamic correlation of interventions
and allows for regions of inaction in the face of disorderly markets. We show that dynamics play an important
role in the CBRT reaction function, which could be evidence of political costs related to the design of the
optimal intervention level and/or the desire of the CBRT to signal its commitment to support the announced
exchange rate policy. Second, we test for nonnormality and heteroskedasticity of the disturbances underlying
the Tobit model of the reaction function. By using an estimator that is robust to heteroskedasticity and
nonnormality -Powell’s LAD estimator- we are able to judge the consequences of ignoring these two issues on
the estimated reaction function. Finally, estimating the CBRT’s reaction function for two subsamples allows
us to contrast the motives for intervention under two alternative exchange rate regimes: managed ﬂoat and
free ﬂoat.
The plan of the remainder of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we describe our intervention data.
In section 3, we present our quantitative model for foreign exchange interventions. In section 4, we discuss
the econometric techniques. In section 5, we report estimates of the reaction function for the managed ﬂoat
and the free ﬂoat period. Section 6 concludes.
2D a t a
The data set analyzed in this paper contains daily Turkish Lira/US dollar spot exchange rates at 3:30pm,
St, the interbank overnight interest rate for Turkey, the U.S. federal funds rate, and daily values of foreign
exchange interventions by the CBRT separated into purchases and sales. The data on CBRT interventions in
the Turkish Lira/US dollar market are measured in millions of US dollars and comprise data for the managed
3ﬂoat and the free ﬂoat regimes. Although, the total data set covers the period between November 1, 1993
and December 31, 2003, we restrict our analysis to two sub-samples well deﬁned by diﬀerent exchange rate
regimes and the absence of ﬁnancial and exchange rate crisis.1 These subsamples are: the managed ﬂoat
period between March 1, 1995 and December 31, 1999, and the free ﬂoat period from February 27, 2001 to
December 31, 2003.
Figure 1 plots the development of the daily Turkish Lira/US dollar exchange rate and the daily spot
returns (100 ∗ ∆lnSt) during the managed ﬂoat regime, as well as the foreign exchange purchases and
sales carried out by the CBRT. The ﬁgure shows that during the managed ﬂo a tp e r i o dt h ee x c h a n g e
rate experienced a virtually continuous depreciation. Starting at minimum of 39,899 Turkish Lira per US
dollar on January 2, 1995, the exchange rate reached a value of 540,098 by December 31, 1999. Spot
returns for this period ﬂuctuated between -2.6% and 3.9%, with the largest variations being observed during
1995. Interventions were carried out in 64.5% of the days in the sample with sales (33.9%) being slightly
more frequent than purchases (30.6%), particularly during the ﬁrst two years of the managed ﬂoat period.
Moreover, interventions appear to have been carried out in an eﬀort to smooth movements in the exchange
rate. For instance, when the Turkish Lira depreciated at the end of 1995 and then appreciated in January
19 9 6 ,t h eC B R Ti n t e r v e n e di nt h ef o r e i g ne x c h a n g em a r k e ti na ne ﬀort to dampen the movements in the
exchange rate. Note that net interventions (purchases minus sales) took on negative values on the last days
of December 1995 and then positive values in January 1996. Moreover, purchase and sale interventions seem
to be correlated over time as the CBRT carried out interventions on consecutive days.
The described behavior of interventions appears to be consistent with the exchange rate policy that
prevailed during the managed ﬂoat period. In accordance with the standby agreement signed with the IMF
in early 1995, the CBRT’s policy was aimed at curbing inﬂation using the nominal exchange rate as an anchor,
1An interesting question that is beyond the scope of this paper, but will be addressed in future reaserch, is unveiling the
tactics followed by the CBRT to carry out foreign exchange intervention during ﬁnancial and exchange crisis.
4and particularly at attaining stability in the ﬁnancial markets. Increases in the foreign exchange basket,
deﬁn e di nt e r m so fG e r m a nm a r k sa n dU Sd o l l a r s 2, were supposed to match the target for the monthly
inﬂation rate. Sharp depreciations of the Turkish Lira versus the US dollar, which were followed by large
interest rate diﬀerentials and increased capital outﬂows, would have caused pressure on the CBRT to intervene
in the foreign exchange market. Furthermore, the inability of the Treasury to achieve a ﬁscal discipline,
combined with the lack of independence of the CBRT, might have constituted an important pressure on the
market.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the daily Turkish Lira/US dollar exchange rate, daily spot returns,
and the foreign exchange purchases and sales carried out by the CBRT during the free ﬂoat period. The
ﬁgure illustrates how the Turkish Lira/US dollar exchange rate had an upward trend during the ﬁrst year
following the switch in the exchange rate regime. Daily changes in the exchange rate were reﬂected in the
higher variability of the returns during 2001, after the onset of the new regime. In the subsequent years
the exchange rate appears to have ﬂuctuated around 1.5 millions Turkish Lira per US dollar, while returns
showed a decrease in volatility. The frequency of interventions was lower during the free ﬂo a tp e r i o dt h a n
during the managed ﬂoat: interventions were carried out only on 50.4% of the days in the sample, with
purchases (29.4%) being more frequent than sales (21.0%). Figure 2 provides some evidence that the CBRT
carried out interventions in an eﬀort to counter movements in the Turkish Lira/US dollar exchange rate.
Interventions carried out during 2001 took mostly the form of sales and were smaller in absolute value than
the purchase interventions carried out during 2003. Whereas the frequency of interventions declined during
the free ﬂoat period -in comparison with the managed ﬂoat period- Figure 2 suggests that interventions
continued to be correlated over time.
The beginning of the free ﬂoat period coincided with the independence of the CBRT and an agreement
2The basket was revised to 1 US dollar and 0.77 Euro with the introduction of Euro in 1999.
5with the IMF to intervene only in limited amounts in the foreign exchange market. According to IMF
(2003), ”under the [...] ﬂoating exchange rate regime, the Central Bank [was] committed to intervene only to
smooth out extreme movements in exchange rates” (2003, p.244), and in agreement with the targets for the
foreign exchange reserves. Throughout the free ﬂoat period, interventions were apparently directed towards
dampening excessive volatility in the exchange rate, but without aﬀecting its long-run value. In March 2001
the CBRT began conducting pre-announced (amount and timing) purchase and sale interventions in the form
of foreign exchange auctions with the aim of improving the transparency of interventions. Sale auctions
carried out in 2001 were intended to sterilize excess liquidity in the market, while purchase auctions in 2002
and 2003 were directed at increasing foreign exchange reserves.3
Two common features of foreign exchange intervention are apparent from Tables 1 to 3. First, purchase
and sale interventions take on zero values during a large number of business days and a wide range of non-zero
values on intervention days. In contrast with interventions in other countries, foreign exchange interventions
in Turkey do not appear to be carried out in multiples of a certain amount, but roughly take on a continuum
of values.4 On average, the magnitude of purchase interventions was larger during the managed ﬂoat period
than during the free ﬂoat period, while the size of sale interventions was smaller.
Second, periods of foreign exchange interventions appear to be followed by periods of intervention, and
periods of no activity by similar periods of no intervention. Yet, the magnitude, the frequency, the sign of
successive interventions (Table 2) and the average duration between interventions (Table 3) changed between
regimes. Note that during the managed ﬂoat period about 80% of foreign exchange purchases (sales) were
followed by interventions of the same sign, whereas during the free ﬂoat period this probability increased
to about 5%. This change across exchange rate regimes is also apparent from the change in the average
3See Guimar˜ aes and Karacadag (2004) for a detailed description of the diﬀerent phases of interventions since the ﬂoating of
the exchange rate.
4According to Baillie and Osterberg (1997) the U.S. Federal Reserve carried out interventions in integer multiples of $10 or
$100 million of US dollars.
6duration between interventions. For the managed ﬂoat period the average duration between opposite-sign
interventions was 3 days, whereas the duration between same-sign intervention was 5 days. The average
duration between same-sign interventions remained unchanged during the free ﬂoat period, while the duration
between a ﬁrst negative and a second positive intervention increased to 18, and that between a positive and
a negative intervention was 87 days.
Summarizing, an empirical model of central bank intervention should be able to capture the following
features of the data: (i) periods of no intervention in the face of changing conditions in foreign exchange
markets; (ii) temporal correlation between interventions: and (iii) a structural change in the reaction function
across exchange rate regimes. In the following section we present a model that captures the two ﬁrst features
of the data. As for the changes in regime, we treat the two periods separately.
3 A Quantitative Model of Central Bank Intervention
We use the following dynamic censored regression model to describe the foreign exchange intervention policy
of the CBRT:
INV i




























t denotes foreign exchange intervention; the superscript i = B (i = S) denotes purchase (sale)
interventions; the superscript j denotes the opposite sign intervention,j= S (j = B); α is constant term;
xt is a vector of explanatory variables; and εt is a stochastic disturbance. Note that the usual static Tobit
model for purchase (sale) interventions is just a restricted version of the dynamic censored regression model
7(1)w h e r eρi
k =0f o ra l lk, and the εt is assumed to be normally distributed.
One reason why this dynamic censored regression model is particularly well suited for analyzing inter-
vention behavior is that it captures the fact that interventions are carried out only on a reduced number of
business days. Because the dependent variable remains unchanged in the presence of non-zero values for the
regressors for a signiﬁcant number of business days, estimation of the central bank intervention reaction func-
tion cannot be performed using conventional estimators. In fact, OLS estimation would lead to inconsistent
estimates. In the past authors have dealt with this econometric issue in diﬀerent manners. For instance,
Almekinders and Eijﬃnger (1994) and Humpage (1999) estimated two separate Tobit models for purchase
and sale interventions; Almekinders and Eijﬃnger (1996) and Kim and Sheen (2002), among others, used
the friction model developed by Rosett(1959) to treat purchase and sale interventions simultaneously. Jun
(2004) modiﬁed Rosett’s friction model in order to capture asymmetries in the response of purchase and sale
interventions to disorderly markets, yet in his model the asymmetry depends on the value of one explanatory
variable, which acts as a treshold.
Separate Tobit models for purchase and sale interventions allow us to capture two important features of
the reaction function: the region of inaction and the asymmetric response of purchase and sale interventions
to disorderly markets. However, the usual Tobit model ignores the fact that foreign exchange interventions
are correlated over time -once an intervention is carried out, another intervention is likely to take place in
the following day. Ito and Yabu (2004) conjecture that this dynamic correlation is due to the presence of
political costs associated with the process of designing an optimal intervention policy. More speciﬁcally, the
cost of intervention on a particular day t may be lower if intervention has been carried out in the previous
day. This situation would arise if the central bank has to negotiate interventions with another party and,
once an agreement has been reached, interventions can be carried out during several days. This appears to
have been the case in Turkey for both periods under analysis.
8Temporal correlation can also arise if the objective of the central bank is to minimize an intertemporal
loss function that is non-time separable. That would be the case if, for instance, the central bank wants
to minimize not only current deviations of the exchange rate from a target, but also past realizations of the
deviations. For instance, if the nominal exchange rate is used as an anchor in a deﬂation program, the
central bank would want to reduce the number of times that the target is missed in the same direction in
order to maintain its credibility5. Consecutive interventions in the foreign exchange market could signal the
commitment of the central bank to the announced policy.
Thus, the formulation considered in this paper appears to be appropriate given that 0 values of INV i
t can
capture the optimal level of intervention when the costs of intervention exceed the beneﬁts, and the presence
of lagged values of INV i
t may capture the presence of political costs and/or signalling. Furthermore, the
inclusion of lags of opposite sign interventions, INV
j
t , allows us to account for substitutability between
purchase and sale interventions.
As for other determinants of foreign exchange interventions, we consider three measures of disorderly
foreign exchange markets commonly used in the empirical literature6. More speciﬁcally, we assume that


















a measure of excess exchange rate volatility,h t−1; and the interest rate diﬀerential between the domestic,
it−1, and the foreign, i∗
t−1 , overnight interest rates. Note that all the regressors in xt are lagged one
5For a similar argument in the case where the loss function of the central bank is a function of the inﬂation rate see Bomﬁn
and Rudebusch (2000).
6We refer the reader to Sarno and Taylor (2001) for a very completeand recent survey on the topic.
9period to avoid simultaneity problems. We now proceed to discuss the motivation and measurement of these
regressors.
3.1 Deviations from the target exchange rate
Empirical literature on foreign exchange intervention has found evidence that deviations of the exchange
rate from a target Granger-cause intervention. For instance, taking into consideration a very long horizon,
Dominguez and Frenkel (1993) show that deviations from purchasing power parity have a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on interventions. When short run considerations -such as a ’leaning against the wind’ policy- are taken into
account, the target exchange rate is better represented by its past values. This target has been commonly
modelled as a moving average of the exchange rate in the past, where the order of the moving average
representation varies across studies. For instance, short term horizons of 7, 10 and 25 days have been
used by Almekinders and Eijﬃnger (1996), Humpage (1999), and Frenkel, Pierdzioch and Stadtmann (2003),
respectively. Kim and Sheen (2002), Neely (1998), and Le Baron (1999) use a 150-day moving average rule
claiming this is a common choice of horizon among market traders. Alternatively, Ito and Yabu (2004)
model the target as a weighted average of three past exchange rates in order to capture diﬀerent horizons.
We model the target as the weighted average of two past representative exchange rates: the Turkish
Lira/U.S. Dollar exchange rate in the previous day and its past-month moving average. Thus, deviations
from the target are given by:
st − sT











The moving average target level for the exchange rate can be thought of as representing past levels of the
10exchange rate, which is not to say that the latter is considered to be at a desirable level in the previous
month. It merely enables us to test whether the central bank systematically ‘leaned against the wind’ and
tried to smooth deviations from the past-month moving average. In addition, it allows interventions to be
motivated by daily ﬂuctuations in the exchange rate.
There are two reasons why we do not consider moving averages with longer horizons. First, during the
managed ﬂoat period the CBRT never announced that it would intervene to attain a long-term target. As
we mention before, the economic environment and the lack of independence of the CBRT during this period
made it more exposed to economic and political pressures to intervene whenever the Turkish Lira depreciated.
Once the free ﬂoat regime was adopted and the agreement with the IMF was in place, interventions where
explicitly intended to control short-term volatility in the exchange rate without aﬀecting the long-term
exchange rate and taking into consideration the foreign exchange reserve target. Second, our focus on short-
term deviations is consistent with results that establish the validity of maximum likelihood estimation for
the censored regression model in a time series context (de Jong and Herrera, 2004). In fact, these results
hinge on the assumption that the regressors are stationary, which would not be the case for deviations of the
exchange rate from medium and long horizon targets.
3.2 Excess exchange rate volatility
Whereas there seems to be ample evidence suggesting that central bank intervention responds to deviations
of the exchange rate from a target, evidence regarding the eﬀect of volatility is less conclusive. Baillie and
Osterberg (1997) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect of a GARCH measure of the deviation of conditional volatility
from unconditional volatility in the response function of the Federal Reserve Bank and the Bundesbank.
Using data for the US, Germany and Japan, Dominguez (1998) ﬁnds that exchange rate volatility does not
Granger-cause intervention in the 1977-1994 period. On the other hand, Kim and Sheen (2002) ﬁnd a
11signiﬁcant eﬀect of volatility on the interventions of the Reserve Bank of Australia, and Frenkel, Pierdzioch
and Stadtmann (2003) reach similar conclusions for the Japanese monetary authority.
Following these studies, we compute a measure of excess exchange rate volatility in the following manner.
We assume that the data generating process for the log diﬀerence of the exchange rate is given by a GARCH-
M(1,1):
∆st = b0 + b1ht + b2INV B









Ditλi + ut, (4)
ht = ω + αu2








vt ∼ N (0,1), (7)
where INV B
t denotes foreign exchange purchases; INV S
t denotes foreign exchange sales; (it − i∗
t) denotes
the overnight interest rate diﬀerential; and Dit denotes a vector of day of the week dummies. We estimate
the model and then measure daily volatility in the foreign exchange market as the estimated conditional
variance, ht, of the daily Turkish Lira/US dollar spot returns. Note that we lag the intervention variables
two periods in order to avoid simultaneity.
Table 4 reports estimation results for the GARCH-M(1,1) model (4)-(5), as well as for a GARCH(1,1),
corresponding to the managed ﬂoat period. Regardless of the model speciﬁcation, the main conclusion that
arises from these estimation results is that the CBRT’s interventions were not successful in stabilizing the
conditional variance or the conditional mean of the Turkish Lira/US dollar exchange rate. This can be seen
from the statistically insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient on interventions in the conditional variance and the conditional
mean equations. Changes in the level of the exchange rate appear to have been driven by interest rate
diﬀerentials (t − stat =2 .5) with increases in the daily exchange rate being on average higher on Mondays
12(t − stat =9 .96) than on other days of the week. We ﬁnd that ARCH and GARCH eﬀects capture the
evolution of the conditional variance and no signiﬁcant eﬀect of the latter on the conditional mean.
Similarly, during the free ﬂoat period (see Table 5), foreign exchange interventions carried out by the
CBRT had no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the conditional mean of the Turkish Lira/US dollar exchange rate. For
this period, the conditional mean for the exchange rate is well described by a random walk with day-of-the-
week eﬀects. As it was the case for the managed ﬂoat period, the behavior of the conditional variance is well
captured by a GARCH(1,1) process. The estimation results reported in Table 5 suggest that foreign exchange
sales had a positive but only marginally signiﬁcant eﬀect on the conditional variance (t − stat = 1.91). In
other words, sale interventions seem to have increased the volatility of the exchange rate during the free ﬂoat
period. In contrast with the managed ﬂoat period, interest rate diﬀerentials do not appear to have had a
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the behavior of the daily Turkish Lira/U.S. dollar exchange rate. These
results are consistent with those of the recent work by Guimar˜ aes and Karacadag (2004) who estimate an
asymmetric component GARCH model.
One could argue, however, that our ﬁnding of a non-statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of intervention is driven
by the presence of a bias in the maximum likelihood estimates of the conditional mean and conditional
variance. Iglesias and Phillips (2004) ﬁnd that this is the case in small samples when non-zero mean variables
(e.g. intervention values) are included in the conditional variance equation of a GARCH model. To make
sure that this is not the case, we reestimate our GARCH models using demeaned values of the interventions.
Estimation results -not reported herein but available from the authors- are virtually unchanged.
Given our ﬁndings, we use as measure of exchange rate volatility the estimated conditional variance of the
GARCH(1,1) model for the managed ﬂoat and the free ﬂo a tp e r i o dr e p o r t e di nT a b l e s4a n d5 ,r e s p e c t i v e l y .
133.3 Interest Rate Diﬀerentials
Interest rate diﬀerentials constitute another possible force driving central bank intervention. Particularly,
the central bank might consider interest rate diﬀerentials as a proxy for potential exchange rate overshooting
(Kim and Sheen, 2002). Baillie and Osterberg (2000) found that excess-dollar denominated returns over
uncovered interest parity (UIP) were associated with purchases of dollar by the Federal Reserve, whereas
deviations from UIP had a negative eﬀect on sales of dollars by the German Bundesbank.
In section 3.2 we showed that interest rate diﬀerentials had a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the level of
the exchange rate during the managed ﬂoat period. Hence, we would expect that, if the CBRT aimed at
smoothing deviations from an exchange rate target, excess returns over UIP would lead to interventions in
the foreign exchange market. In this paper, we use the overnight money market rate for Turkey and the
U.S. federal funds rate in order to calculate the interest rate diﬀerential, (it − i∗
t). In this manner we are
able to compare interest rates of a 1-day maturity, which avoids the econometric problems related to the use
of forward rates with overlapping contracts.
Yet, an alternative measure of Turkey’s daily market interest rate calculated by the CBRT is a weighted
average of the interest rates in the secondary market for treasury bills and bonds, where the weights are
computed according to their transaction volumes. Because Turkey’s overnight money market interest rate
remained unchanged for large number of consecutive days -particularly during the free ﬂoat period-, one could
argue that this weighted average represent a better proxy for the daily market interest rate. Estimation
results using this alternative interest rate not reported in the paper, but available from the authors, are
virtually identical.
144 Econometric Techniques
Consider the dynamic Tobit model, that is a censored regression model (1) where the residuals εt are assumed
to be normally distributed with variance σ2. Then, the scaled Tobit log likelihood function, lT (b), conditional
on INV i
t−1, ..., INV i
p, is given by




lt (b)( 8 )
where










































De Jong and Herrera (2004) establish that maximizing the log likelihood function (8) over the set of possible
parameter values b ∈ B, produces consistent estimates, b βT, of the dynamic Tobit model. Because b βT has
an asymptotic standard normal distribution, we can obtain standard errors using the computed Hessian of
the log likelihood, or the quasi maximum likelihood estimate of the variance7. With regards to the number
of lags of the dependent variable, we select the number to be included, p , using Bayes information criterion
(BIC).
To obtain estimates of the dynamic censored model that are robust to non-normality and heteroskedas-
ticity we use Powell’s CLAD estimator. Powell’s CLAD estimator, e βT ,i sd e ﬁned as the minimizer of the
7We report quasi maximum likelihood standard errors.
15absolute deviations, ST (b), over b ∈ B,w h e r e
ST (b)=ST (ρ,δ)( 9 )
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De Jong and Herrera (2004) show that e βT is consistent for the parameters in the censored regression model
and has an asymptotic normal distribution with mean β and variance M−1ΩM−1. Because there is no
closed form solution to this minimization problem, we compute the CLAD estimates using the iterative
linear programming algorithm proposed by Buchinsky (1994). To implement this iterative algorithm, we







































where sgn(·) denotes the sign function. Then, in the second iteration, we restrict the sample to those
observations for which the ﬁtted values e β
(1)0




t]0, and solve the
LP problem for e β
(2)
using the restricted sample. We repeat this procedure until the set of observation
used in two consecutive iterations is unchanged. Because Powell’s CLAD estimator does not provide a
ﬁrst-round estimate of the variance, M−1ΩM−1, we proceed in the following manner. First, we estimate






















can be interpreted as a ”heuristic” derivative of the objective function ST (b). We
estimate this long-run variance using nonparametric kernel estimation; following the suggestions of Andrews
(1991) we use a Bartlett kernel and select the bandwidth according to his formula. To compute c M,w e
16also obtain an estimate of the conditional density of the innovations in (1) evaluated at zero, f(0|wt)b y
nonparametric kernel estimation. In this case we use a higher-order Gaussian kernel estimation with the
order and bandwidth selected according to Hansen (2003, 2004).
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Tobit Estimates
Maximum likelihood estimates of the Tobit model, associated standard errors and diagnostic statistics are
presented in Table 6 (managed ﬂoat period) and Table 7 (free ﬂoat period). We derive three main conclusions:
(i) the persistence in interventions suggest that the CBRT had to exert pressure on consecutive days on the
foreign exchange market in order to guide the exchange rate in the desired direction; (ii) the response of
purchase and sale interventions of the CBRT to disorderly markets was asymmetric; and (iii) the switch in
the exchange rate regime was reﬂected in an increased role of exchange rate volatility in the reaction function.
This empirical evidence underlines the importance of accounting for dynamics in the central bank reaction
function. Lags of the dependent variable in both purchase and sale equations are positive and statistically
signiﬁcant. The degree of persistence in interventions decreased in the free ﬂoat period, as can be seen
by the reduction in the magnitude of the coeﬃcients on the lagged dependent variables, and the number of
lags selected by the BIC. The dynamic behavior of interventions across subsamples is also reﬂected in the
statistical signiﬁcance of lags of the opposite sign intervention. Note that during both periods, the coeﬃcients
on lagged purchases (sales) have a negative sign in the opposite-sign intervention reaction function. These
results may be interpreted as evidence of a signaling channel and/or political costs involved in designing the
optimal intervention policy. In fact, the switch to a free ﬂoat regime and the reduced economic and political
pressure associated with the CBRT’s independence, are consistent with the decrease in persistence.
17As we mentioned above, we derive two main conclusions regarding the eﬀects of ”disorderly” markets
on foreign exchange intervention: (i) diﬀerences between the reaction functions for sale and purchase inter-
ventions highlight the importance of accounting for asymmetries; (ii) changes in the exchange rate policy
aﬀect the reaction function across subsamples. To substantiate these claims we ﬁrst compare the reaction
functions for purchase and sale interventions for the managed ﬂoat period. Then we compare the estimation
results across exchange rate regimes.
The estimated reaction function for the managed ﬂoat period (see Table 6) suggest that deviations from
the short-run exchange target, devMA
t−1, had a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on foreign exchange
sales (t − stat =3 .02), whereas the eﬀect on foreign exchange purchases was negative but only marginally
signiﬁcant (t − stat = −1.83). These results provide empirical support for the ”leaning against the wind”
hypothesis of intervention: the CBRT was more likely to carry out sale (purchase) interventions when the
Turkish Lira depreciated (appreciated). These results are consistent with the revealed objective of the
CBRT -maintaining a stable real exchange rate-, and the inﬂationary pressure experienced by Turkey during
the managed ﬂoat period. Regarding the conditional volatility of daily exchange rate movements, its eﬀect
is negative and statistically signiﬁcant on foreign exchange sales (t − stat = −2.51)a n di n s i g n i ﬁcant on
purchases (t − stat =0 .30). All things equal, the CBRT was more likely to carry out foreign exchange
sales when the exchange rate volatility was perceived to be low. Finally, interest rate diﬀerentials had a
positive eﬀect on purchase interventions (t − stat =2 .26), but no statistically signiﬁcant impact on sales
(t − stat = 1.41).
Estimation results reported in Table 7 reveal signiﬁcant changes in the tactics used by the CBRT when
intervening in the foreign exchange market during the free ﬂoat period. First, there is no clear evidence of
”leaning against the wind” during the free ﬂoat period. The coeﬃcient on the change in the exchange rate,
dev1
t−2, in the purchase (sale) reaction function is positive (negative) and statistically signiﬁcant. However,
18this result is reversed when we consider the response of the CBRT’s purchase interventions to deviations
from the target at a longer horizon, devMA
t−2. Second, for the free ﬂoat period the eﬀect of the conditional
volatility of daily exchange rate movements on purchase interventions is positive and statistically signiﬁcant
(t−stat =2 .04). This suggest that, in contrast to the behavior during the managed ﬂoat period, the CBRT
carried out purchase interventions during periods of increased volatility. Regarding interest rate diﬀerentials,
we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀe c to nb o t hp u r c h a s e( t − stat = −3.15) and sale (t − stat =6 .29) interventions.
Two speciﬁcation issues that are commonly addressed in Tobit settings are heteroskedasticity and nonnor-
mality (Maddala and Nelson, 1975). The ﬁrst results in inconsistency of the maximum likelihood estimates
of the Tobit model, with the level of censoring being the main determinant of this inconsistency (Greene,
2003). Similarly, nonnormality of the underlying disturbances results in inconsistency of the maximum
likelihood estimates. Thus, to test whether the Tobit speciﬁcation of the reaction function is appropriate,
we conduct tests for homoskedasticity and normality.
Tables 6 and 7 report the results for a Lagrange multiplier test of the null hypothesis that the Tobit
residuals are homoskedastic (Greene, 2003). This test is obtained by assuming that the residuals ex-










t−p,x t}. The test has chi-squared distribution with the degrees of freedom equal to the
number of variables in zt. For the managed ﬂoat period we reject the null of homoskedasticity at a 1% level
with a χ2
8 =8 5 4 .2( 9 2 7 .3) for purchase (sale) interventions. Similarly, for the free ﬂoat period, a χ2
8 =5 3 2 .0
(342.2) leads us to reject the null of homoskedasticity for purchase (sale) interventions at a 1% level.
These tables show measures of skewness and kurtosis for the Tobit residuals, as well as the Jarque-Bera
statistic. We ﬁnd strong evidence of non-normality for both subsamples, with nonnormality being more
evident for the free ﬂoat period. Note that with a χ2
2 =9 0 4 2 .6 (4032.0) for purchase (sale) interventions, the
Jarque-Bera statistic leads us to reject the null of normality for the managed ﬂo a tp e r i o da ta1% level. This
19is also the case for the free ﬂo a tp e r i o dw h e r et h eχ2
2 = 127233.7 (596931.1) for purchase (sale) interventions.
The non-normality of the Tobit residuals is also evident in Figure 3. Note that the distributions are highly
skewed with a long right tail. In addition, the distribution of the Tobit residuals is leptokurtic relative to
the normal. This asymmetry should be kept in mind when comparing the Tobit and the CLAD estimates.
In fact, whereas the latter provides estimates that are robust to nonnormality and heteroskedasticity, it is
an estimator of the median and not the mean, as it is the case in the Tobit model.
5.2 Powell’s CLAD Estimates
Evidence of heteroskedasticity and nonnormality indicate that estimates of the reaction function obtained via
maximization of the conditional log likelihood function (8) might be inconsistent. Therefore, we proceed to
estimate the dynamic censored regression using Powell’s CLAD estimator. Estimation results and associated
standard errors are reported in Tables 8 and 9.
Although, the main conclusions regarding the importance of dynamics, the asymmetric response of pur-
chase and sale interventions, and the change in the CBRT tactics, are essentially unaﬀected, there are two
main diﬀerences between the CBRT reaction function implied by the Tobit and the CLAD estimates. First,
Powell’s CLAD produces parameter estimates on the measures of disorderly markets that are larger in ab-
solute value for the managed ﬂoat period and smaller for the free ﬂoat period -with the only exception of
the parameter on ht−1 in the sales equation. These results suggest that violation of the normality and
homoskedasticity assumptions in the Tobit model, might lead to understating or overstating the eﬀect of
disorderly markets on the CBRT’s reaction function.
More speciﬁcally, according to the CLAD estimates, interest rate diﬀerentials played a signiﬁcant role in
determining the tactics followed by the CBRT when carrying out not only purchase, but also sale interven-
tions. These results point out to a change in the response across exchange rate regimes. While during the
20managed ﬂoat period, positive interest rate diﬀerentials had a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on
purchase (t − stat =2 .862) and sale (t − stat =4 .012) interventions, during the free ﬂoat period the eﬀect on
sales remained positive and signiﬁcant (t − stat = 11.781) ,w h e r e a si ts w i t c h e ds i g no np u r c h a s ei n t e r v e n t i o n s
(t − stat = −3.568).
Powell’s CLAD estimates indicate that both during the managed and the free ﬂoat regimes, periods of
increased volatility in the foreign exchange market lead to heightened purchase and reduced sale interventions
by the CBRT. This can be seen from the positive and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on ht−1 for purchase
interventions during the managed and the free ﬂoat regimes (t−stat =2 .842 and 4.297, respectively) and the
negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on sales (t−stat = −1.849 and −5.211, respectively). In other words, the
CBRT was more likely to carry out purchase interventions when the exchange rate volatility was perceived
as being high, and foreign exchange sales when the volatility was perceived as being low.
Second, across both subsamples, the robust estimator suggest a somewhat smaller degree of persistence in
foreign exchange interventions. Powell’s CLAD estimates on the lagged dependent variables for both periods
and interventions are smaller than their Tobit counterparts. Other things equal, the Tobit-estimated average
increase in purchase (sale) interventions at time t + 1 resulting from a one dollar increase in purchase (sale)
of U.S. dollars at time t would be larger than the increase implied the CLAD estimates. This result is
consistent with the fact that interventions have an asymmetric distribution with a large right tail (see Tables
5 and 6, and Figure3). In other words, the average value of interventions, which is estimated by the Tobit
model, is larger than the median intervention estimated by Powell’s CLAD.
As it is the case for the Tobit estimates, the reaction functions implied by the CLAD suggest a signiﬁcant
decrease in the persistence of interventions between the managed and the free ﬂoat period. Yet, whereas
the coeﬃcients on the lags sale interventions in the purchases equation retain their negative signs across
estimation methods and exchange rate regimes, this is not the case for all the lags of purchase interventions
21on the sales equation. Note that whereas the Tobit model clearly imply that purchase interventions constitute
a substitute for sale interventions, and vice versa, this is not evident from the CLAD estimates for the free
ﬂoat period. Whereas this might be a result of the bias in the Tobit estimates, an alternative explanation
involves possible small sample bias in the CLAD estimates (see Kahn and Powell, 2001). This is an issue
that we will be able to address in the future as more observations become available and validity of two-step
estimation of censored regression models in a time series context is established.
6 Conclusions
Is central bank intervention eﬀective? In Turkey, foreign exchange interventions appear not to have been
eﬀective in altering the exchange rate level, and had only a positive and marginally signiﬁcant eﬀect on
the exchange rate volatility during the free ﬂoat period. For the managed ﬂoat period, these results are
consistent with high levels of inﬂation, and the focus of the CBRT’s policy on defending the real exchange
rate. As for the free ﬂoat period, our ﬁndings are in line with the objective of the CBRT to let the market
determine the level of the exchange rate, and only intervene during periods of heightened volatility. Yet,
foreign exchange intervention appears to have led to higher, not lower, volatility.
Regarding the motives for intervention, in this paper we show that dynamic considerations play an
important role in determining the tactics used by the CBRT. In fact, our estimation results indicate that
past values of intervention are informative for predicting current intervention levels. Our ﬁndings are
consistent with the presence of political costs associated with the design of the optimal intervention policy as
suggested by Ito an Yabu (2004), and/or other transaction costs involved in carrying out interventions. Yet,
other possible interpretation has to do with the central bank’s preferences: persistence in foreign exchange
interventions may be related to the desire of the central bank to minimize the number of times that the
22exchange rate target is missed in the same direction. Indeed, by exerting pressure on the foreign exchange
market on a sequence of days the CBRT might have signalled its commitment to the announced monetary
and exchange rate policy.
Our results agree with ﬁndings of other researchers regarding the importance of excess exchange rate
volatility and interest rate diﬀerentials in determining central bank intervention. However, the empirical
evidence is less conclusive with respect to the role of deviation from an exchange rate target. The magnitude
and signiﬁcance level of these coeﬃcients are particularly sensitive to the estimation method. Diﬀerences
among the parameter estimates obtained from the Tobit and Powell’s CLAD estimator may stem from two
sources: (a) inconsistency of the Tobit estimates due to heteroskedasticity and non-normality; (b) a diﬀerence
between the mean -estimated by the Tobit- and the median -estimated by Powell’s CLAD- of interventions,
due to an asymmetric distribution of the underlying disturbances. With the caveat that Powell’s CLAD
estimator in a time series setting might suﬀer from small sample bias (Kahn and Powell, 2001)- a si ti s
the case in cross-sections-, our ﬁndings suggest that future investigations into the motives for central bank
interventions should take into consideration the eﬀect of heteroskedasticity and nonnormality on the estimated
reaction function.
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27Table 1
Foreign Exchange Interventions, Summary Statistics
All Sample(a) Managed Float(b) Free Float(c)
Purchases Sales Purchases Sales Purchases Sales
Observations 2566 2566 1219 1219 712 712
Mean 85 118 76 106 55 62
Median 40 62 47 69 30 24
Standard Deviation 191 278 88 123 144 72
Maximum 4378 6008 681 879 1517 322
M i n i m u m 0 00 00 0
(a) November 1, 1993 - December 31, 2003
(b)January 2, 1995 -December 31, 1999.
(c) February 27, 2001- December 31, 2003.
Table 2
Sign of successive foreign exchange interventions
Sign of second change
Sign of ﬁrst change Positive Intervention Negative Intervention
Managed Float Period(b)
Positive Intervention 287 73
Negative Intervention 70 238
Free ﬂoat period (c)
Positive Intervention 151 7
Negative Intervention 9 126
See notes for Table 1.
Table 3
Average Duration Between Interventions
Sign of second change
Sign of ﬁrst change Positive Intervention Negative Intervention
Managed Float Period(b)
Positive Intervention 3 5
Negative Intervention 5 3
Free ﬂoat period (c)
Positive Intervention 3 87
Negative Intervention 18 3
See notes for Table 1.
28Table 4
Maximum likelihood estimates of GARCH-in-mean and GARCH models: managed ﬂoat period(a)
GARCH-M(1,1) GARCH(1,1)
Coeﬃcient Standard Error Coeﬃcient Standard Error
Conditional Mean




t−2 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001
INV
S
t−2 -7.44E-05 0.0001 -9.23E-05 0.0001
it−2−i∗
t−2 0.002∗∗∗ 0.0008 0.002∗∗∗ 0.0008
Monday 0.329∗∗∗ 0.033 0.328∗∗∗ 0.032
Tuesday 0.005 0.025 0.003 0.025
Wednesday -0.004 0.027 -0.004 0.027
Thursday 0.009 0.025 0.010 0.026
Conditional Variance
Constant 0.012∗∗∗ 0.003 0.012∗∗∗ 0.003
ε2
t−1 0.157∗∗∗ 0.061 0.161∗∗∗ 0.061
ht−1 0.739∗∗∗ 0.048 0.735∗∗∗ 0.046
INV
B
t−2 -1.78E-06 3.17E-05 -5.13E-06 3.08E-05
INV
S






























htvt, with vt ∼ N(0,1)
where
4st = log diﬀerence of daily exchange rate;
INV
B
t = CBRT purchases;
INV
S
t = CBRT sales;
it−i∗
t = Overnight interest rate diﬀerential;
Di = Daily dummy (Monday-Thursday);
ε2
t = Squared residual;
ht = Conditional variance of log diﬀerence daily exchange rate.
(a)Sample: March 1, 1995 through December 31, 1999.
∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10% level.
29Table 5
Maximum likelihood estimates of GARCH-in-mean and GARCH models: free ﬂoat period (a)
GARCH-M(1,1) GARCH(1,1)
Coeﬃcient Standard Error Coeﬃcient Standard Error
Conditional Mean




t−2 4.06E-05 0.0002 5.87E-05 0.0002
INV
S
t−2 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002
it−2−i∗
t−2 -0.001 0.002
Monday 0.200∗∗ 0.100 0.200∗∗ 0.100
Tuesday 0.124 0.098 0.124 0.098
Wednesday 0.220∗∗ 0.105 0.220∗∗ 0.105
Thursday 0.081 0.103 0.083 0.103
Conditional Variance
Constant 0.082∗ 0.045 0.081∗ 0.045
ε2
t−1 0.245∗∗∗ 0.080 0.244∗∗∗ 0.080
ht−1 0.644∗∗∗ 0.125 0.646∗∗∗ 0.124
INV
B
t−2 -4.69E-06 0.0002 -4.30E-06 0.0002
INV
S






























htvt, with vt ∼ N(0,1)
where
4st = log diﬀerence of daily exchange rate;
INV B
t = CBRT purchases;
INV S
t = CBRT sales;
it−i∗
t = Overnight interest rate diﬀerential;
Di = Daily dummy (Monday-Thursday);
ε2
t = Squared residual;
ht = Conditional variance of log diﬀerence daily exchange rate.
(a) Sample: February 27, 2001 through December 31, 2003.
∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10% level.
30Table 6
Tobit estimates of the CBRT’s reaction function: managed ﬂoat period(a)
Purchases of US Dollars (B) Sales of US Dollars (S)
Coeﬃcient Standard Error Coeﬃcient Standard Error
Constant -85.717∗∗∗ 20.929 -163.715∗∗∗ 28.995
INV
B
t−1 0.486∗∗∗ 0.069 -0.398∗∗∗ 0.135
INV
B
t−2 0.353∗∗∗ 0.064 -0.124 0.128
INV
S
t−1 -0.316∗∗ 0.145 0.600∗∗∗ 0.085
INV
S
t−2 -0.054 0.086 0.311∗∗∗ 0.081
dev
1
t−1 -16.128 10.725 13.997 16.08
dev
MA
t−1 -7.735∗ 4.237 18.935∗∗∗ 6.266
ht−1 6.042 19.975 -84.464∗∗ 33.542
it−1−i∗




























t = CBRT purchases;
INV S
t = CBRT sales;
dev
1
t = exchange rate deviation from previous day rate;
dev
MA
t = exchange rate deviation from past-month moving average;
ht = Conditional variance of log diﬀerence daily exchange rate;
it−i∗
t = Overnight interest rate diﬀerential.
(a) Sample: March 1, 1995 through December 31, 1999.
(b) Lagrange Multiplier Statistic to test for heteroskedasticity.
∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10% level.
31Table 7
Tobit estimates of the CBRT’s reaction function: free ﬂoat period(a)
Purchases of US Dollars (B) Sales of US Dollars (S)
Coeﬃcient Standard Error Coeﬃcient Standard Error
Constant 73.987∗∗ 36.341 -355.652∗∗∗ 50.551
INV
B
t−1 0.267∗∗ 0.128 -2.409∗∗∗ 0.887
INV
S
t−1 -0.789∗ 0.410 0.698∗∗∗ 0.128
dev
1
t−2 23.968∗∗∗ 8.990 -8.425∗∗ 3.554
dev
MA
t−2 -10.334∗∗ 4.394 1.558 1.413
ht−1 7.031∗∗ 3.452 0.085 1.597
it−1−i∗




























t = CBRT purchases;
INV S
t = CBRT sales;
dev
1
t = exchange rate deviation from previous day rate;
dev
MA
t = exchange rate deviation from past-month moving average;
ht = Conditional variance of log diﬀerence daily exchange rate;
it−i∗
t = Overnight interest rate diﬀerential.
(a) Sample: February27, 2001 through December 31, 2003.
(b) Lagrange Multiplier Statistic to test for heteroskedasticity.
∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10% level.
32Table 8
Powell’s LAD estimates of the CBRT’s reaction function: managed ﬂoat period: (a)
Purchases of US Dollars (B) Sales of US Dollars (S)
Coeﬃcient Standard Error Coeﬃcient Standard Error
Constant -38.826∗∗∗ 10.338 -121.864∗∗∗ 28.428
INV
B
t−1 0.321∗∗∗ 0.018 -6.064∗∗∗ 0.295
INV
B
t−2 0.146∗∗∗ 0.017 2.666∗∗∗ 0.075
INV
s
t−1 -0.730∗ 0.419 0.428∗∗∗ 0.040
INV
s
t−2 -0.107∗∗ 0.048 0.148∗∗∗ 0.038
dev
1
t−1 -0.161 4.357 14.162 10.895
dev
MA
t−1 1.755 1.739 -1.755 4.984
ht−1 25.141∗∗∗ 8.846 -61.172∗ 33.075
it−1−i∗
t−1 0.410∗∗∗ 0.143 1.695∗∗∗ 0.422
Skewness 2.792 3.237
Kurtosis 15.992 22.255
Jarque− Bera 10065.709 20771.125
Initial observations 1217 1217
















t = CBRT purchases;
INV S
t = CBRT sales;
dev
1
t = exchange rate deviation from previous day rate;
dev
MA
t = exchange rate deviation from past-month moving average;
ht = Conditional variance of log diﬀerence daily exchange rate;
it−i∗
t = Overnight interest rate diﬀerential.
(a) Sample: March 1, 1995 through December 31, 1999.
∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10% level.
33Table 9
Powell’s LAD estimates of the CBRT’s reaction function: free ﬂoat period(a)
.
Purchases of US Dollars (B) Sales of US Dollars (S)
Coeﬃcient Standard Error Coeﬃcient Standard Error
Constant 63.502∗∗∗ 15.560 -37.529∗∗∗ 3.752
INV
B
t−1 0.192∗∗∗ 0.012 0.233∗∗∗ 0.004
INV
S
t−1 -0.259∗∗ 0.115 0.403∗∗∗ 0.009
dev
1
t−2 -4.486∗∗∗ 1.211 -1.250∗∗∗ 0.293
dev
MA
t−2 0.039 0.920 0.735∗∗∗ 0.175
ht−1 3.017∗∗∗ 0.702 -0.745∗∗∗ 0.143
it−1−i∗
t−1 -1.350∗∗∗ 0.378 0.826∗∗∗ 0.070
Skewness 12.300 1.007
Kurtosis 188.530 39.683
Jarque− Bera 1001178.9 38578.237
Initial observations 693 693
















t = CBRT purchases;
INV S
t = CBRT sales;
dev
1
t = exchange rate deviation from previous day rate;
dev
MA
t = exchange rate deviation from past-month moving average;
ht = Conditional variance of log diﬀerence daily exchange rate;
it−i∗
t = Overnight interest rate diﬀerential.
(a) Sample: February 27, 2001 through December 31, 2003.
∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10% level.
34Figure 1:M a n a g e dﬂoat period
35Figure 2: Free ﬂoat period
36Figure 3: Histogram of Tobit standardized residuals
37